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II. 10B-5: THE RuLE

I.

AND ITS PURPOSES ......................................

THE SAGA OF A MINING DISCOVERY

Our story opened on a cold, blustery night in November, 1963, as
the "desolate, muskey-covered land around the mining town of Timmins,
Ontario
."I was going through the first snow of winter. There followed
from that time (during which the original drilling took place in which
deposits of various valuable minerals, including copper, zinc, silver, and
lead were sought), until April 16, 1964, a period of clandestine operations8
conducted by Texas Gulf Sulphur Company.' There operations culminated in the verified discovery of one of the biggest and richest bodies of
5
ore ever uncovered.
There was a sharp increase in market price of Texas Gulf shares
during this time (from seventeen to thirty-four dollars) and, after the
discovery was made public, a continued steep rise (as high as one hundred
and twenty-two dollars earlier this year). But the fact is that definite
knowledge of the mining explorations was limited to relatively few individuals until April 12, 1964. Prior to that time, there was only a continually growing number of rumors and suggestions to alert the investor
in, or holder of, Texas Gulf stock. It was in large part to answer those
t Formerly Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor
in Research and Writing for Freshmen.
1. Emphasis is the author's, except as otherwise indicated.
2. For a continuation of this rather dramatized account of the early facts concerning
the Texas Gulf "find," see Welles, Bonanza Trouble, Life, Aug. 6, 1965, p. 29.
3. As we shall see, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. maintains it had sound reason for keeping
its work secret.
"We were faced with possible leaks of information-our drilling program was under
surveillance by people in low flying aircraft; . . ." A Report by [the] President, at the Annual
Meeting of Stockholders, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., Houston, Texas, Apr. 22, 1965. See text
accompanying notes 22 and 23 infra.
4. Hereinafter referred to variously as "Texas Gulf," "Company" and "defendantcompany."
5. The facts recited above, and those which follow, have been gleaned from a number
of sources. See, e.g., Welles, Bonanza Trouble, supra, note 2; Report, supra note 3; Business
Week, May 8, 1965, p. 141; Wall Street Journal, Apr. 21, 1965, p. 4, col. 3.
939
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who "rumored," and to inform (perhaps "assuage" would be a more
proper term) those who heard "something's up," that the Company, on
April 12, issued a press release6 which stated, in part:
These reports [the "rumors"] exaggerate the scale of operations,
and mention plans and statistics of size and grade of ore that
are without factual basis and have evidently originated by
speculation of people not connected with TGS. The drilling
done to date has not been conclusive, but the statements made
by outside quarters are unreliable and include information and
figures not available to TGS.7
Following this announcement, and for the next four days, the price
of the shares dipped an average of two to three points. But on April 16,
1964, following its preparation the night before, the Company released
another statement: 8 "Texas Gulf Sulphur Company has made a major
discovery of zinc, copper and silver in the Timmins area of Ontario,
Canada . . . . Preliminary data indicate a reserve of more than 25
million tons of ore. . . ."I That day the price of Texas Gulf stock rose

approximately three points on the incredible volume of 444,200 shares.
Two weeks following this second release, the market value had gone
from thirty-four to fifty-eight dollars per share.
It was only natural that the Securities and Exchange Commission,' 0
always mindful of activities concerning unusually active stocks, would
commence a preliminary investigation. What they found led the Commission to believe that there had been numerous and flagrant violations
of section 10-B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" and of Rule
1OB-5, adopted thereunder. 2 After a prolonged period of inquiry, the
6. Carried in newspapers the following day.
7. Ibid.
8. For the Company's explanation of the necessity of these two closely-timed, yet
somewhat divergent statements, see text accompanying note 23, infra.
9. Supra note 7.
10. Hereinafter referred to as the "Commission" or the SEC.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78J(b) (1958).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails . . . (b) to use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative, deceptive, or
other fraudulent device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
The Securities Exchange Act will hereinafter be referred to as the "Exchange Act."
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10B-5 (1949).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. . ..
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Commission filed suit against the Company and several individual defendants (officers, directors, and employees) on April 19, 1965.18 The
complaint included a recitation of many of the undisputed facts discussed
above, and made further crucial allegations concerning the behavior of the
defendants. The SEC "charged" that the individual defendants had
"Knowledge and information of material facts concerning the result of
defendant Texas Gulf's drilling. . . not generally known by the investing
public" and had thereafter purchased Texas Gulf stock "without disclosing
to the seller the . . .material facts." The defendants were also charged

with having passed this "inside information" on to family and friends
who were able to purchase stock from sellers who had no access to the
"bullish" information about the mining explorations. Furthermore, and
more expectedly, the SEC alleged that the Company's press release of
April 12, 1964, was known by certain of the defendants to be "materially
false and misleading."
Clearly, if the allegations were correct, violations of Rule 10B-5' 4
were committed. Most obviously, the alleged acts are rendered "unlawful"
by clause 2 of the Rule;' 5 it might also be argued that the complaint
stated a cause of action under clause 1.16 The Commission sought broad
relief. It asked that several of the defendants be directed to offer rescission to the persons from whom they bought." This relief does not seem
extraordinary, but in an unprecedented 8 move, the SEC sought to have
the court order certain of the defendants who "tipped" the inside information to outsiders," who in turn purchased the stock for their own
benefit, to make restitution to those who sold to the outsiders. 20 In the
language coined by Professor Loss, the "tippor" must pay back the
profits which inured to their "tippers."'"
The defendants, in their answers, disputed few of the tangible facts
13. Complaint of Plaintiff, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
14. Hereinafter, sometimes called the "Rule."
15. Supra note 13.
16. Ibid. In addition, although no specific "act, practice or course of business [by the
defendants] which operates .. .as a fraud . . . ." is designated as such by the Commission,
it is also reasonable to presume that it will argue that all of the facts alleged constitute
such actions and, as such, violate clause 3 of the Rule. This is most probable in that the
Commission's first prayer for relief asked that the individual defendants be enjoined,
inter alia, from such conduct.
17. Each of the defendant-officers and directors who had purchased stock during the
"suspect" period offered to turn over their profits to the Company, but these offers were
"summarily rejected by the SEC." Wall Street Journal, Apr. 23, 1965, p. 3.
18. Ramifications of this and other "new" aspects present in Texas Gull will be
discussed later. See Part IV, infra.
19. As we shall see later, there is room to argue that once outsiders gain "inside information," they become, for all practical purposes, insiders themselves, and can possibly be
held civilly liable as such. See text accompanying note 112 et. seg., infra.
20. One other order sought was that the defendants nullify all unexercised stock options
granted during the period involved.
21. This latter penalty seems harsh indeed. Further consideration of this is found in
Part IV, infra.
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alleged. For the most part, they argued that they bought the stock
because: The Company's over-all business prospects were excellent at the
time (and they were); that sound business practice dictated a tight-lip
policy;2" and, most importantly, that they did not know the magnitude
of the ore discovery before the news was made public on April 16, 1964.2"
The Commission's complaint, as was to be expected, " triggered a
number of private actions2 5 brought under the Rule2 6 by former shareholders of the Company who had sold their stock to either the insiders,
their tippees or others during the period in question.
The problems-some real, some mythical-presented in the Texas
Gulf litigation (including both the SEC and the private actions) are
manifold and significant. In order to properly understand them, and
perhaps some of the likely or desired results, it is first necessary to understand the Rule.
II.

10B-5:

THE RULE AND ITS PURPOSES

A. The Implied Right in General
It is only fair to say that when the Commission adopted the Rule
on May 21, 1942, the objective most immediately in mind was to extend
protection to sellers 7 against the unlawful acts of persons offering to
buy securities from them. 28 The courts have not, however, been willing
to allow a cut-and-dried view of the Rule's meaning to prevail.2 9 As a
result, many basic questions have been raised since its adoption concerning what duties it imposes and what rights it creates. With respect to
the duties, at very least, the Rule charges insiders with an affirmative duty
to disclose material facts which are unknown to others with whom they
deal, which if known, would affect the investment judgment of those
others. Concerning any rights created, the Rule does not so easily yield
even "at very least" conclusions. No express right of action of any sort
22. The SEC has no quarrel with such a policy, but maintains that insiders must not
purchase while it is in force. See discussion of the Cady, Roberts & Co. proceeding, in text
accompanying notes 80-84, infra.
23. As previously pointed out, an enormous number of important and often intriguing
questions are raised by these charges, denials and "justifications" (defenses). They will
be considered at length in Part IV, infra.
24. See Miami Herald, Apr. 22, 1965, p. 1, § F.
25. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 3.
26. The problem of whether, and to whom, a private right of action is accorded under
the Rule is dealt with in Part II-A, infra.
27. Prior to the adoption of 10B-5, there was nothing in either the Securities Act, or
the Exchange Act which covered fraud in the purchase by persons other than brokers or
dealers.
28. The following expression of Commission intent was released on the same day that
the Rule was announced: "The new rule closes a loophole in protections against fraud,
administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or corporations from buying
securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase . . . ." SEC Release No. 3230, at 183184 (May 21, 1942).

29. See Part III, infra.
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is provided by the section or the Rule. Thus, suits instituted by private
persons have been founded upon an implied right of action."0 The basis
for the implication is found in the opening phrase of the Rule: "It shall
be unlawful .

. ." Some have maintained that this language only gives

a right of enforcement to the Commission, and does not create a private
civil remedy, but this argument has not met favor. Indeed, since the landmark decision in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,8 seven circuit courts
and ten district courts have recognized an implied right of action under
the Rule. 2
An inherently stronger and still viable argument exists against the
implication of a remedy for the buyer of securities under 10B-5. The
argument is that since the buyer is given express remedies under sections

11" and 121 4 of the Securities Act of 1933, s" he has no need for further
relief, and thus none should be implied from the Exchange Act of 1934.
The same arguments have been used in favor of denying a right to the
buyer under section 17 (a) of the Securities Act, 8 the provisions of which
are practically identical to Rule 1OB-5, and in the light of which the
latter was framed.87 The argument is that a buyer who could sue pursuant
to such express remedy should be allowed to find no place for himself
in the language of section 17(a) or Rule 1OB-5. A most literary and philosophical expression of this view is found in Professor Loss' treaties:
30. Professor Loss has stated: "It does not seem too much to say that the implied

liabilities have turned out to be far more significant than the express liabilities which
Congress created." 3 Loss, SEcURITiEs REGULATION 1759 (2d ed. 1961).

31. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). This case, and the other significant ones under
10B-5, are discussed at length in Part III, infra.
32. See, e.g., First Circuit: Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965); Second
Circuit: List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); Rucke v. Roto Am.
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951); Third Circuit: Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Slavin v.
Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum); Fifth Circuit: Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (Sth Cir. 1960); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266
F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); Eighth Circult: Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962);
Ninth Circuit: Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir 1956);
Tenth Circuit: Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Stevens v.
Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958). Briefly stated, this section provides in detailed fashion that
the purchaser of a registered security may sue the issuer for untrue statements of material
facts in the registration statement.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1958). Here again, actions are only for buyers, and though it
applies to sales of unregistered securities (if in violation of § 5) as well as those registered,
when there has been an untrue statement or an omission, it has a great limitation in that the
seller is only "liable to the person purchasing such security from him ...
" Thus, privity
is required for an action to lie.
35. The Securities Act of 1933 (hereafter called the "Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-aa (1958).
36. With respect to § 17(a), see SowARs, FEDERAL SEcURrras Acr § 10.01(1) (1965),
and see generally, 3 Loss, SEcURITiEs REGULATION 1787-8 (2d ed. 1961).

37. The other major anti-fraud provision is § 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, and
particularly Rule 15(1)-(2) thereunder. This section applies to the use of a "manipulative,
deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance "by a broker or dealer, and thus is not
really germane to this discussion.
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[I] s not this potpourri [i.e., the "mixing" of express and implied
remedies by buyers] the reductio ad absurdum of the view which
opens Rule 10B-5 and 17(a) to buyers who for some reason find
their express remedies under the 1933 Act to be inadequate?
The development is more than a little reminiscent of what a
German scholar has called "the flight into the general clauses"
• . . based on "good faith" and similar formulas."
At this juncture, a logical question would seem to be: In view of the
extensive express liability provisions in favor of the purchaser, why is
he attracted to Rule 1OB-5? The answers verily bound out of those very
express liability provisions once they are contrasted with the Rule. Other
than the obvious limitations on the opportunities to apply section 11
(e.g., registered securities only)3 9 and section 12 (e.g., requires privity),
both sections have a shorter statute of limitations" and section 11 provides that a plaintiff may be required to furnish costs of the suit, including
reasonable attorney's fees.4 Since none of these factors, which can preclude or inhibit buyers' suits under the express actions, pertains to 1OB-5,
the advantages incident to its use are obvious.
Most courts, once faced with the problem, have allowed the buyer
to sue. 2 Two cases which have dismissed a buyer's 10B-5 complaint
have done so on somewhat different grounds. 3 One decision was written
by the author of the Kardon opinion and enunciated a requirement that
the two acts, being in pari materia, must be construed together. Believing
that Congress could not have meant the buyer to have an easier time
after 1934 than under the Securities Act,44 he ruled that an action could
not be maintained under 1OB-5. 5
Of course, one other alternative remedy which the buyer must
overcome in his quest to both "have his cake and eat it" is section 17(a)
of the Securities Act. As noted previously, 10B-5 was modeled after,
and is almost a carbon copy of, section 17 (a)-merely slightly broadening clause 2 and extending protection (if not an action) to the seller. It
38. 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGUIATION 1789-90 (2d ed. 1961).
39. Supra note 30.
40. Both §§ 11 and 12 are governed by § 13, which limits the time for bringing an
action to one year following discovery of the wrong, with a maximum of three years after
the alleged violation. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958). For a discussion of which statute of limitations to apply, see text accompanying notes 53 and 56, infra.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (e) (1958).
42. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (a well-reasoned opinion);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
43. Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Montague v.
Electronic Corp. 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
44. That is, free of the restrictions accompanying his express rights. See text accompanying notes 39-41, supra.
45. Rosenberg, supra note 43. For an extensive treatment of the "buyer's implied rights"

see Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors under
SEC Rule 10B-5, 20 U. MIAmI L. REV. 81 (1965).
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is, therefore, quite difficult from an intellectually precise viewpoint to
reconcile affording the buyer civil relief under both.46 It is submitted,
however, that this is no reason to conclude that there should not, in fact,
be a buyer's right implied under 10B-5.
B. The Buyer is "In"
Whereas the prior provisions discussed47 limited the right to suit
under them to the buyer, section 10(B) and Rule 10B-5 specifically
applies "in connection with the purchase or sale . . . ." Had Congress
actually wanted solely to "close a loophole in protections against fraud
.. .in the purchase . . . ,"I it seems unlikely that it would have included so clear a reference to the "sale." All of the other provisions indicate an ability, even a tendency, for Congress to limit application of
securities legislation when it so desires.
Perhaps a greater semblance of consistency could be found if no
private action was implied for the buyer under 17(a)," since what
express relief there is, is found in the same Act. Then 1OB-5, offering
the only comprehensive relief to the buyer and the sole relief to the seller,
would make more sense.
Regardless of the section 17(a) solution, it would appear that
while Congress may not have primarily intended to create a right for the
buyer under section 10(B) and the Rule, certainly the overriding goal
of both Acts was to afford the greatest possible relief to the investor. 0 It
does not seem logical to argue that because the primary effect of the Rule
was to extend a "new" right to the seller, that the buyer should be precluded from reaping its collateral results. Is it not, then, most reasonable
(and most effective of the broad purpose of the Act) to believe that the
rights given the buyer by sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act have been
made corollary to, and been expanded by, Rule 1OB-5 ?"'
46. Professor Sowards seems to have carried this realization to its logical conclusion
when he stated that if, as indeed appears to be the case, the buyer has a civil right under

IOB-5, it is not even necessary to determine if the same is true under § 17(a). SOWARDS,
§ 10.01 (1) (1965).

FEDERAL SECUiRITiES ACT,

47. See text accompanying notes 39-41, supra.
48. From the Commission's release of May 21, 1942, supra note 28.
49. Alas, however, this does not appear to be the case. See, e.g., SOWARDS, TE FEDERAL
Sscuarrms AcT (1965). But see, 3 Loss, SECUarrIEs REGULATION, 1428 n.20, 1785 n.338 and
accompanying text (2d ed. 1961).

50. 78

CONG. REC.

7861 (1934).

51. A negative answer brings into play the step-child-seller, favorite son-buyer dilemma
raised by Loss:
Should they [the courts] permit buyers to sue under 10b-5 and thus ignore the safeguards which Congress chose to throw around buyers' actions in §§ 11 and 12?
Or should they restrict the Kardon doctrine to suits by sellers [e.g., Texas Gulf]
and thus treat the seller step-child far better than the buyer favorite son-not to
mention the fact that any discrimination between seller and buyer would fly in the
face of § 10(b) and the rule?
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C. The Right Assumed: Issues in the Pleadings

What, then, of the seller (or buyer who is allowed to escape the limits
of section 13)52 who sues under the Rule. How long does he have to commence his action? Neither the section nor the Rule provide for, or allude to,
a period of limitations. Thus, with a federal statute in question, a good
attorney's fancy naturally turns to thoughts of the Erie doctrine.53
Certainly, the forum's statute should control when the action is at law.
And since 10B-5 is at base an anti-fraud provision, the action would

properly be legal."4 This is probably so even if the plaintiff seeks equitable rescission as an alternative, or in addition, to damages.5 5 But as of
this time there appears to be no definite holding on the characterization
of the 1OB-5 remedy.5"

In addition to the question of when the plaintiff must file his complaint, there is some issue with respect to its necessary ingredients,
particularly concerning reliance, scienter and privity. Although the lan57
guage of the Rule does not expressly indicate that reliance is necessary,
most courts have simply assumed that it is a prerequisite to recovery.58

However, it does seem that, particularly with regard to clauses (1) and
(3), scienter can be dispensed with due to the broad scope of the Rule,
52. See note 40, supra.
53. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. Should, however, the court consider the 10B-5 right as a "federally created" one
to be prosecuted solely in equity, then of course the allowable period should be governed
by laches.
55. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) which held that where liability
is statutorily predicated, a prayer for equitable relief affects merely the remedy, not the
legal right.
56. Dictum in a recent decision does stress the fraudulent nature of the 1OB-5 action
and thus lends support to the belief that it would properly be considered "legal" when
determining whether to look to a state statute or laches. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781,
784 (1st Cir. 1965). This case also concerns the interesting, and not "just academic" question
of whether the statutory time is tolled until the discovery of the violation, even if such a
tolling practice is not the rule in forum state? The court answered in the affirmative since
the right is tied to the federal statute. "[F]ederal law must determine the date of accrual
[of the cause] here even though the period of limitation is determined by state law." But see,
Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965) (Dicta: the action was
brought more than the maximum period after the "discovery" of the Fraud.).
57. In view of the fraud-preventive source of the Rule, it is important to keep in
mind Rule 9(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure as a general guide in forming
pleadings. "[C]ircumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be pleaded with particularity."
58. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965); Reed v. Riddle Airlines,
266 F.2d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
But one court did recently articulate a basic rationale which probably formed the basis
of the assumption by the others:
Assuredly, to abandon the requirement of reliance would be to facilitate outsiders'
proof of insiders' fraud, and to that extent the interpretation for which plaintiff
contends might advance the purposes of Rule lob-5. But this strikes us as an
inadequate reason for reading out of the rule so basic an element of tort law as the
principle of causation in fact. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.
1965).
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when contrasted to common law deceit.68 Finally, contrary to the more
restrictive section 12(2), it can be said that privity is not essential under
the Rule, especially where there has been at least some showing of
reliance.60
As seen above (with appropriate qualifications noted) the 10B-5
remedy exists primarily for the purpose of discouraging fraudulent conduct. But, just as fraud is the basis of the Rule, so disclosure is its foremost objective. At common law, the courts were not in accord as to the
duty of disclosure to be imposed on an insider. The preferable view
seemed to be the one laid down in the landmark case of Strong v. Repide.s '
There the controlling stockholder and manager of a corporation purchased
stock from outsiders without disclosure of the then current status of
negotiations for the sale of the property. The court enunciated the socalled "special facts" doctrine and held the defendants guilty of a breach
of their duty of disclosure. At the common law, however, this represented
the minority position;62 the prevalent view required no such disclosure by
corporate fiduciaries.

It is clear, therefore, that the Rule grew out of the minority attitude.
This fact is readily and emphatically borne out by the cases.13 A statement in the Kardon64 decision serves as a good indication of the minimum
duty required by the Rule:
[T]he act is violated when directors with inside information
purchase stock without full disclosure. Such conduct includes
engaging in any "act, practice
or course of business which...
5
would operate as a fraud.M
At first glance, however, such a basic statement is as broad in its
ramifications as it is vague on its face. There are several possible theories
of disclosure to be gleaned from the Rule. Some flow from its face. For
example, incomplete or complete failure of disclosure can be held under
clause (1) to be a "device ... to defraud," or under clause (3), a fradulent "act . . . or course of business." Or, if information is withheld or

stated untruthfully, it can be said that a duty of disclosure under clause
59. See generally 3 Loss, SEcuRiTis REGULATION 1430, 1766 (2d ed. 1961). Contra,
Weber v. C. M. P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (ironically citing the same page

of Loss).
60. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 59, at 1767. Contra, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio &
Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952)
(But see, dissenting opinion by Judge Frank). For a most thorough discussion of this
problem, see Klein, op. cit. supra note 45.
61. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
62. For a list of authorities supporting this view see Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass.
358, 362, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933).
63. An analysis and discussion of many of the most important decisions on this point
follows in Part III of this paper.
64. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
65. Id. at 614.
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(2) has been breached. All is not so simple, however. Many complex problems are raised with respect to drawing lines between those who can be
held to such a duty, and those who, having received disclosures from insiders, may safely act upon the disclosed information without fear of
breaching a concomitant responsibility to further disclose. Many of the
issues are present, expressly or impliedly, in the Texas Gulf litigation, and
they will all be considered under the discussion of that situation.66
A CRYSTAL BALL UNPOLISHED
The first instance which showed the Commission's attitude toward
the enforcement of 1OB-5 was Ward La France Corp.6 7 In a published
report of the investigation, the Commission held that when two officers
knew of, but failed to disclose to a selling stockholder, optimistic news
about negotiations for a merger, they had violated the Rule. It was not too
long before this construction of insiders' responsibilities met with judicial
approval and expansion.
III.

CASES TO DATE:

A. Kardon: Herald of Implied Liability
Loss has termed "implied liability" under the SEC statutes "[T]he
most surprising development in the whole area of [the statutes'] civil
liabilities."68 Judicial recognition of this area was first accorded in the
now famous case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co."9 Suit was instituted by two of the company's four stockholders (each of whom held
an equal portion of the company's stock) against the other two to recover
profits made by the latter following their purchase of the plaintiffs' stock.
The gravamen of the complaint was that prior to the stock transaction
between the parties the defendants knew of, but failed to disclose, a
prior sale of the bulk of the corporate assets to another company. Wherefore, the plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to relief under section
10(B) and Rule 10B-5. The defendants moved to dismiss contending
that the Rule provided no civil remedy. They argued that since such
remedies are express, in other sections of the securities acts, Congress
must have intended that no civil action would lie under the Rule. The
court denied this motion, and thereby held that a right of action was
established by the Rule, on two grounds.
The first of these grounds was the statutory tort doctrine; viz., an
action for violation of a statute accrues to members of a class for whose
benefit the statute was passed.7" Thus, the court, in effect, reasoned that
there was a presumption in favor of the plaintiffs' alleged rights and held:
66. See Part IV, infra.
67. 13 SEC 343 (1943).
68. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 59, at 1757.
69. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (on motion to dismiss).
70. There was nothing "new" about this doctrine at the time Kardon was decided. It
had been recognized by the supreme court and the writers since the early 1900's. See
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); 2
COOL Y, TORTS 1408 (3d ed. 1906).
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Where, as here, the whole statute discloses a broad purpose to
regulate securities transactions of all kinds and, as a part of
such regulation, the specific section in question provides for the
elimination of all manipulative or deceptive methods in such
transactions, the construction contended for by the defendants
may not be adopted. In other words, in view of the general
purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision
is not sufficient to negative what the general law provides.7
Judge Kirkpatrick also found an alternative theory on which the
complaint would be sufficient: the contractual voidability theory under
section 29(B) of the Exchange Act.7 2 The Judge wrote: "It seems to me

that a statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall be void
almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it."7 Thus was this
"most surprising development" launched on its ever-growing way.74 At
trial, the court found for the plaintiffs, and the initial implied-basis recovery was complete.76
B. The TransamericaChronology, et seq.
Two suits were instituted against Transamerica Corporation upon
the same facts, before the same judge, and for primarily identical reliefthe second suit was successful; the first was not. The reason for the
different results is of great importance.
The common facts were these. The defendant-corporation was the
major stockholder of a tobacco company. As a result of this position, it
knew that the market value of the large tobacco inventory was much
higher than that which was reflected on the company's financial statements. In each instance, the plaintiff was a minority stockholder who,
while ignorant of this information, sold his stock to Transamerica. The
crucial distinction between the suits was the different theories upon
which each plaintiff sought recovery.
The first suit 6 sought relief on the theory of common law deceit.
Since the governing law in the forum followed the so-called "majority
71. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 69, at 514.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(c) (1958).
73. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 69, at 514.
74. Professor Loss has indicated a feeling that judicial "expansion" of the Rule could
conceivably get out of hand:
The danger . . . is that the continued denigration of the buyers' express remedies
under the 1933 act in favor of Rule 10b-5, and even § 17(a) of the 1933 act itself,
may persuade the Supreme Court-which has yet to consider any implied remedy
under the SEC statutes-to throw its collective hands up and the Kardon doctrine
out. (Emphasis is his). 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 59, at 1790.
75. [T]hese provisions [§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] apply to directors and officers
who, in purchasing the stock of the corporation from others, fail to disclose a fact
coming to their knowledge by reason of their position which would materially
affect the judgement of the other party to the transaction. Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
76. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943).
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view,"" the district court, in 1943, granted the defendant a summary
judgment on the basis of findings that the defendant had not actively
concealed information and was under no common law duty to disclose.
The second suit 78 predicated its claim on Rule 1OB-5. This time the
court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a cause of action was
stated under the Rule. Most probably, since the complaint was tested
in 1947, the second plaintiff had learned from Kardon. The real importance
of the Transamerica chronology is that it offered an early and graphic
view, one of significant import and great impact, relating to the effects
of 1OB-5. This single Congressionally authorized and administratively
promulgated provision ended, once and for all, the necessity for active
deceit by a defendant-corporate insider as a condition precedent to liability
for a breach of duty to disclose.
Since these early important decisions, implied liability has been
given wide recognition.79 Many cases have enlarged upon this theme,
considering a variety of problems and rendering some thoughtful and
interesting decisions. Certainly the most important of these to the purview
of this paper is Cady, Roberts & Co.8 Initially, the case is noteworthy
because it marked the first time that the Commission imposed 81 an affirmative obligation of disclosure on a corporate insider who was selling. This
was the result of an action brought by the SEC against both Cady,
Roberts and its broker-partner. The latter had received information from
an insider-director of Curtiss-Wright Corporation, in advance of a public
release,82 that the company was cutting its dividend. He thereupon
executed a solicited order to sell, and sold for certain of his discretionary
accounts.
The Commission gave a substantial hint of things to come (specifically a Texas Gulf-type situation) when it articulated its view of a
very broad duty under the Rule.
Section 17 and Rule 10B-5 apply to securities transactions by
"any person." Misrepresentationswill lie within their ambit no
matter who the speaker may be. An affirmative duty to disclose
material information has been traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. . . . These three groups, however, do not exhaust
the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation. 8
77. Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947).
79. Supra note 32.

80. Securities Exch. Act Release No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961).
81. This was a report on an SEC investigation, not a court decision.

82. Actually the defendant-broker's advance notice was barely more than a half-hour.
Yet, an enormous profit can be, and was made in the stock market in a matter of a few
minutes, and thus there is no less of a violation. The Commission did undoubtedly consider
this as one indicia of an absence of active deceit, and therefore, imposed a relatively light
sanction.
83. Cady, Roberts & Co., supra note 80.
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Once it had so grandly subscribed to the position that the realm
of potential application of the Rule is very large indeed, the Commission,
speaking through its Chairman, Mr. Cary, stated the "two principal
elements" on which the disclosure duty is founded, and also the rationale
for its imposition:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information . . . we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications
persons who are in a special relationship with a company . . .
thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities.
Intimacy demands restraintlest the uninformed be exploited. 4
Though most of the cases under section 10(B) and the Rule have
concerned insiders, neither is expressly limited to the activities of such
persons.85 Furthermore, just as almost all private transactions are
covered, s" 10(B) refers to "any security," and hence is not limited to
securities sold on an exchange or through an over-the-counter market.8 7
An interesting case concerning the omission to disclose a rather
unusual material fact is Reed v. Riddle Airlines.88 The fact, known to the
insider-buyer, was that a widely-renowned financier was interested in
buying a large block of stock. 8 The fifth circuit held that the insider
had a duty to disclose this fact, and his failure to do so was grounds for
liability. In another unusual case, the Rule was used to impose liability
when the alleged fraud concerned the value of the consideration (land)
given for the security, rather than the value of the security itself.9"
Thus, it should be clear that all the present "hullabaloo" about the
Rule should not be based solely on the Texas Gulf litigation. The Rule
has been steadily growing in recognized scope. Some recent noteworthy
litigation (other than Texas Gulf) has helped provide impetus to the
battlecry of "Beware 1OB-51"
84. Ibid.

85. Apparently contrary to this belief is Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1955). There, relief was denied pursuant to the court's finding that the defendants
were not "insiders" and therefore, owed no duty under the Rule. This case has, however,
been harshly criticized on occasion.
86. All three clauses of Rule 1OB-5 apply when the prohibited act is performed "by the
use of any means . . . of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange."
87. See Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ia.
1952); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
88. 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959).
89. His subsequent purchase did cause a spectacular rise in market price.
90. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
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C. Recent Decisions
List v. Fashion Park, Inc.91 is perhaps the most interesting recent
case to come to reported circuit court decision on the pleadings or the
merits. The chronology of events that formed the basis of the suit follows.
On November 4, the defendant (through its directors) received word that
there might be a buyer for the company. This information was not then
disclosed to the plaintiff-minority stockholder. On November 17, plaintiff
sold his interest 2 for eighteen dollars and fifty cents per share. Five days
later, negotiations for the possible sale began. On December 7, the
defendant-corporation reached a preliminary understanding with the
purchasing corporation and approximately two months thereafter a formal
contract of sale was executed, which provided for a purchase of stock from
its shareholders at a price of fifty dollars per share.
Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had failed to disclose
material facts which would have affected his decision to sell. The court
disagreed with this allegation, as a matter of law, for it held that the
"possibility" (beginning on November 4 and continuing until the date
plaintiff sold his stock) that Fashion Park might be sold was not a material
fact." The essence of this finding seems to be that the Rule was not
violated since, had the plaintiff known of the inside information, his
judgment as to whether to sell would not have been reasonably affected.
The case is also noteworthy for its consideration, with respect to
10B-5, of reliance (discussed earlier)," non-disclosure and administrative
purpose. The court held that "total non-disclosure," is a probable ground
for action under the Rule. 5 And taking specific notice of the dichotomous
bases of private and Commission suits under the Rule, the court said:
"The aim of administrative proceedings under Rule 10B-5 is to deter
misconduct by insiders, rather than to compensate their victims."9
91. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
92. At least one of the buyers of the plaintiff's shares was a director of the defendantcorporation.
93. It appears that the argument made along this line by the defendants in Texas Gulf
is their best chance for success. In that case, however, among the hurdles which would have
to be leaped are: (1) that the company's alternative to their primary failure to disclose, and
to their allegedly misleading disclosure of April 12, would have been total disclosure; and
(2) that on the basis of all information known to insiders (and their tippees), the plaintiffs'
judgment of whether to sell would not have been affected, in that the information was not,
prior to April 16, conclusively material.
94. Supra note 58.
95. The court noted that under the minority common law rule of disclosure, an insider
could be liable even though "perfect silence was kept" (see Strong v. Repide, supra note 61)
and stated: "Surely we suppose that Rule 1OB-5 is as stringent in this respect as the
federal common law which preceded it." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., supra note 91, at 462.
See also Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
96. The position taken by the SEC in their prayer for relief in Texas Gulf seems
contrary to this statement. (See text accompanying notes 17-20, supra.) There, the Commission seeks, inter alia, to have the court order the defendants to make restitution to their
sellers, and thus to compensate their victims. To reconcile the statement in the text with the
prayer in the complaint, it is necessary to argue in a fashion analogous to one argument
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The burden of proof was thus placed; its extent was established in
Stevens v. Vowell.17 After perfunctorily recognizing that "[O]f course,
. . . the burden is upon the plaintiff to . . .make out a case under the

statute and rule . . . ,98 the court later set forth a simple standard
that the plaintiff must meet: 9 "It is not necessary to allege or prove
common law fraud, to make out a case under the statute and rule. It is
only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such as the material
mis-statement of fact or the omission to state a material fact."
A possible limitation on the seemingly relentless trend in favor of the
broadest construction of 1OB-5 appears in O'Neill v. Maytag.10 0 After the
officers and directors of a company (National Air Lines) in which the
plaintiff held a minority interest agreed to an exchange of stock with another company (Pan Am.) in a ratio apparently unfavorable to National,
plaintiff brought a shareholder's derivative action under 10B-5. The court
denied relief, holding that the alleged misrepresentation concerned only
fraudulent mismanagement. Therefore, since the fraudulent practice complained of was not associated with ("in connection with" might have been
more appropriate) the sale or purchase of securities, no remedy was found
to exist under 10B-5. While for the insider this case might initially appear
to be a ray of light in an otherwise dark void, it is not likely to have any
significant effect on the trend. Rather, it seems only to be an isolated
attempt to utilize the Rule which stretched too far.
Most of the cases under the Rule thus far have concerned either
omissions to stated material facts or statements which have been termed
misrepresentations in light of the circumstances. One which turned on an
"tuntrue statement" was the first affirmance of a 10B-5 right by the first
circuit. 10 ' Plaintiff sold his stock to defendant for forty thousand dollars
after the latter said at a directors meeting that there would be no
material change and things were "about the same" in the company's
prospects for the foreseeable future. This statment was false,'10 2 and
within two years of this acquisition of plaintiff's stock, defendant sold it
at a profit of approximately $660,000.00. This court accorded another
liberal interpretation to the Rule by finding that the defendant had not
made fair or truthful disclosure "within the heavy requirements of the Act,
by the single statement that things were 'about the same.' "I" These
favoring a buyer's right under the Rule, i.e., the fact that the primary objective of administrative action is to deter the insider does not preclude collateral benefits flowing to the
victim. (See text accompanying notes 50-51, supra.)
97. 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
98. It has been pointed out that this burden on the plaintiff is a disadvantage of the
use of 10B-5 vis-h-vis § 12(2) which places the burden on the defendant.
99. Stevens v. Vowell, supra note 97, at 379.
100. 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
101. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965).
102. There had been a firming up of prices and a buildup of a considerable backlog
of orders for the next year, prior to the defendant's statement.
103. Supra note 101, at 785.
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facts are perhaps no more extreme than those in Texas Gulf. Ultimately,
however, both situations turn on whether the relationship between the
facts known to insiders regarding the company's financial prospects,
and the statements which they made about them were such as to warrant
a finding of falsity or material misrepresentation.
One supreme court case and one pending Commission action complete
our look into the crystal ball of litigation prior to Texas Gulf. In the first,
I. I. Case Co. v. Borax,"4 the high Court rendered a decision which may
well lend great support to the argument favoring implied liability under
the Rule. It upheld the existence of a like remedy under the proxy section
(section 14) of the Exchange Act, the pertinent language of which is
strikingly similar 10

5

to section 10(B). The Court affirmed the plaintiff's

implied right to damages resulting from misleading' ° proxy statements:
While this language [in section 14] makes no specific reference
to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is "the
protection of investors," which certainly implies the availability
of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result...
[U]nder the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be
alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose. 07

The proxy section and section 10(B) can, of course, be distinguished
in many ways. But, nevertheless, the theoretical justification favoring
implied liability under one section of the securities acts, as enunciated
in Borax, would appear to apply to 10(B), and others as well. Therefore,
while it is possible that the Court harbors a different view of 10(B), until
such time as the problem is actually before it, it is reasonable to believe
that its present membership will not "throw Kardon out."'0 8
The pending case is of interest since, together with Texas Gulf, it is
an indication of a major crackdown on 10B-5 violators by the Commission. While the only reported proceedings to date dealt with the question
of venue, °0 the facts presented therein are of interest. Once again, as in
the Commission's suit against Texas Gulf, the primary concern is with
inside information which was not made available to the general public,
rather than to particular buyers and sellers claiming injury. Also of
significance, is the allegation in the complaint that the defendants profited
104. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
105. "It shall be unlawful for any person [hereafter is a delineation of prohibited acts]
• . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C.

§ 70n(a) (1934).

106. The proxy material failed to disclose alleged unlawful market manipulation in the
company's stock.
107. J. I. Case Co. v. Borax, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
108. Re-read the quotation in note 74, supra.
109. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 246 F. Supp. 54 (SADN.Y. 1965).
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from non-disclosure in the purchase and sale of stocks. (This resulted
from a merger in which the ratio of exchange differed from the relative
market values of the shares involved, and the defendants allegedly knew
what effect the subsequent public disclosure would have on each company's stock.) Thus, if it eventually is settled that a private right follows
along wherever the Commission can bring an action for enforcement,
then the fact that non-disclosure in the sale is included in this suit portends no good for those who still resist a private action by an injured
buyer.
IV. IMPORT OF TEXAS GULF
It will hopefully be clear from the foregoing that many of the
problems raised in Texas Gulf are not unique."0 Therefore, while Texas
Gulf has caused much consternation, it is but a logical continuation of
the two parallel trends in insider-securities litigation-Commission
actions and private suits under 10B-5. Thus, it seems that its greatest
import is that its notoriety has finally made a legislatively and judicially
declared "matter of public interest" (The Rule)-a truly "public matter"
and concern. Some of the most vital aspects of this concern are considered
below.
The answer to "Who is an insider?" is really anybody's guess.
Perhaps some guidelines can be gleaned from a consideration of a few
examples. As pointed out earlier, the Commission is seeking in Texas Gulf
to hold the "traditional" insiders (officers and directors, etc.) responsible
for the profits made by their "tippees.""' One wonders if the Commission has so quickly departed from the tests of "insidedness" it laid down
in Cady, Roberts since the Commission did not include tippees in the
latest suit."' Why should the tippee not be liable for his own profits?
If "any one particular person" has access to inside information and takes
unfair advantage of it, should he be permitted to benefit from information
he knew was "tipped?" It would seem to this writer that he should not.
Nevertheless, it does appear that such will be the result.
One problem left open is whether the tipper could recover back
from his tippee, but since the basis of the original insider's liability was
fraudulent behavior, it is quite unlikely he could state a cause of action
which would not be contrary to equity and good conscience; and if
he could recover, then he would be "free and clear." Thus, a vicious
cycle is created by an attempt to fix punishment for insider's non-dis110. Professor Loss anticipated a Texas Gulf-type problem when he wrote: "Suppose
an insider has advance knowledge that his company has struck oil or is about to obtain an
extremely profitable contract." His conclusion was that, "Clearly his buying stock without
disclosing that fact violates the Rule ... for the market is going up when the news gets out."
3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 59, at 1460-61.
111. See text accompanying note 17-20, supra.
112. See text accompanying note 84, supra.
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closure or misleading disclosure. 1 ' Furthermore, assuming that these
tippees should be liable as insiders, another large problem remains with
respect to where the line between the insider and the innocent should be
drawn.
Questions have been raised concerning the possible "disclosure"
vel non position of market analysts, reporters, cab-drivers, and corporations themselves. With respect to the analyst, it would seem that reports
and news which he has come upon through independent research should
not be considered "inside" information. There is, however, nothing to
absolutely preclude application of the Rule. The situation of a reporter
using information contained in a press statement before its release to the
public is not so simply resolved. At first, a suggestion to impose liability
in such an instance may appear laughable. But clearly he is in a perfect
position to understand the "inside" nature of the news given to him.
Therefore, if he purchased prior to publication on, for example, the DowJones ticker, it is only reasonable that his duty to disclose should be
tantamount to that of a tippee. 114
Another "first-glance comedy" is the proposition that a cab-driver
who overhears a discussion between corporate insiders should be liable
for profits gained by his use of the accidental tipping. Absurd? Seemingly
yes. But what if the passengers and their positions are well-known to
the driver? How then is that person distinguished from other insidertippees? Granted, this example is certainly extreme. It does, however,
serve to indicate the potential breadth of the Rule. It is possible we have
only had a glimpse of an horizon that may stretch very far indeed.
The corporation may find itself in a dilemma. Undeniably it owes a
general obligation of disclosure to its stockholders. Rule 10B-5 poses
potentially far-reaching effects on that duty. If a corporation has information that is possibly material, then it must decide whether to speak. If it
makes some disclosure, then it faces a charge of being misleading. If it
keeps silent, it risks a suit for non-disclosure. And if it takes the wrong
course of conduct, just what direction its liability will lie is unclear. If
a stockholder sells to his corporation, will the corporation be ordered to
make restitution to him? The point is moot, but the litigation to date does
not render such an action inconceivable." 5
Of course the corporate insiders face no less of a dilemma. But for
them, one guide is clear. If they have access to and knowledge of material
113. Two theoretical solutions to this "cycle" appear. First, perhaps a liability similar to
that of joint tort-feasors could be evolved. A second possibility would be to allow a
personal right of action (and thereby make available recovery) against the "tippee," and a
stockholders' derivative action against the original insider-"tippor."
114. Of course this duty could logically be carried over ad infinitum with respect to
tippees of tippees, etc.
115. The corporation is not charged with making any such purchases in the Texas Gulf
complaint.
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facts not known to the public, they must not transact. When will anyone
with such information be able to safely buy or sell? The answer should
logically be determined by whether he is under a disclosure duty. If such
a duty exists-whether for the reporter, cabbie or any other-then he cannot safely trade, at least for the present.
What, then, constitutes sufficient disclosure? First, it is reasonable
that the news must be actually available to the "public" before the
"caution flag" will be lifted from the insider's portfolio. It would not be
disclosed, as was contended by one Texas Gulf director," 6 at the time
a release is given to reporters. On the other hand, if you are concerned
with a locally held corporation," 7 of whom does the "public" consist?
Once again, there can be no clear-cut answer. If a client seeks to avoid the
attendant risks of non-disclosure to an outsider, a practitioner should
probably advise him that the most widespread possible publication should
be given any "special" information." 8
A new and final consideration under the Rule relates to stockholders'
derivative actions. A typical pattern for such a suit is as follows. If
insiders bought shares from the corporate treasury at a low price (while
others lacked news indicating a rosy future for the corporation), then
an injury to the corporation as seller could easily be alleged in a 1OB-5
suit for non-disclosure. This may seem to fly in the face of section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act, but the fact remains that the action could be, and has
been," 9' considered a violation of the Rule. Once more, then, a previous
Congressional securities remedy appears on its way to being largely supplanted by the Rule.
One immediate result of Texas Gull has been the "clamming-up"
of many corporations and their insiders, all seeking to avoid suits by the
allegedly misled outsider. 20 Clearly, however, by so doing they take a
correlative chance by embarking on a course of total non-disclosure.
Possibly some of the problems considered here are out of proportion.
The Rule may yet turn out to be less than a sleeping giant. But, though its
present use is not entirely revolutionary, it is certainly revelationary.
This writer submits that the greatest value to securities law of Texas
116. See answers filed by the individual defendants.
117. Needless to say, even the smallest ABC, Inc., probably uses at least the mails in
effecting transfers of stock, both from the issuer to a holder, and between selling and
purchasing stockholders.
118. At very least, this "news" must be transmitted to all existing stockholders.
119. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965).
120. A listing of a few of these companies and their reasons for so acting is found in
"Analysts run into a 'Security Blackout,'" Business Week, May 8, 1965, p. 142-3.
Editor's note: The federal district court in New York, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91805
(Aug. 19, 1966), made a finding of fact most recently in the Texas Gulf litigation that
the "insider" provisions of the Rule would only extend to those defendants who bought
stock immediately prior to the press releases. Supra notes 7-9. Extended appellate litigation
can be expected before the case is completely resolved however.
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Gulf's mining discovery is that it unearthed so many vital questionsones which had lain dormant for so long. Regardless of its adherence to
the original Congressional intent, the present trend in the construction
of 10B-5 surely appears to obviate the practical need for many of the
insider-securities sections. The final outcome of all litigation under Rule
1OB-5-past, pending, and probable-may very possibly appear in
future legislation.
It is suggested that desirable legislation should spell out the remedies
which may be pursued, expressly permitting private suits in the clear
language of sections 11 and 12, provide a two year statute of limitation
to run from the date of the discovery of the fraud and do away with the
apparent surplussage with sections 17 and 12(2). Such action would
clarify the inconsistencies which presently perplex the courts.

